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ABSTRACT 
Mobile devices with wireless network capabilities can be 
associated to form ad hoc networks to share resources; however, 
such an association of devices requires authentication. At present, 
PIN is the common authentication method, but in many cases, 
small devices may not have input interfaces to accommodate PIN 
entry. We therefore design a gesture-based authentication scheme, 
called GesturePIN, for associating multiple mobile devices; our 
solution provides the advantage of being adaptable to any PIN 
authentication systems. We have also conducted a quantitative 
user study to understand the speed and accuracy of people using 
our gesture-based system compared to using PIN. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection – 
Authentication; H.5.2 [Information Interfaces and 
Presentation]: User Interfaces – Input devices and strategies. 
General Terms 
Design, Security, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Spontaneous interaction, device association, device authentica-
tion, gesture password. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile devices, such as cellular phones, portable music players, 
etc., are becoming pervasive. With the rapid adoption of mobile 
devices, users are expected to encounter a frequent task of setting 
up communication channels dynamically to exchange data; in 
other words, device associations1 are expected to happen often 
and spontaneously. Wireless ad hoc networks provide suitable 
environments for such events. However, due to the inherent 
                                                                 
1 The term “association” refers to the set up of a connection 
among multiple devices. In many publications, the term 
“pairing” is often used. In this paper, pairing is referred to an 
association of a pair of devices, while association has the 
cardinality of two or more devices. 
 
insecurity of wireless communication, wireless channels give rise 
to security problems [5, 8], like man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attacks [3]. To overcome the security problems, users must be 
involved to assist the authentication of device associations [3]. 
Following the trend of growth of mobile technology, capabilities 
(like processing speed, storage capacity, etc.) of mobile devices 
are improving continuously. Although the specifications are 
advancing, one likely to remain the same is the small sizes of 
mobile devices. This requirement is necessary for mobility, as 
mobile devices must remain small enough that users are willing to 
carry them [6]. However, this brings a physical size limitation to 
the input and output (I/O) capabilities, such as small (or no) 
output displays and slow input methods and, as a result, mobile 
devices have limited user interfaces (UI). The limited UI capabili-
ties of mobile devices induce a challenging task for user-assisted 
authentication, especially in ubiquitous computing. A common 
technique for authenticating devices is to enter the same PIN code 
into the involved devices, like a Bluetooth “passkey” for pairing, 
but such scheme requires the devices to have a number input 
interface. Particularly, smaller and specialized devices (like GPS 
loggers, portable MP3 players, etc.) do not have interfaces to 
accommodate number entries, and, hence, PIN authentication 
becomes impractical as it cannot be implemented. To overcome 
this problem, an alternative authentication technique is required. 
In recent years, accelerometers have been increasingly integrated 
into mobile devices (e.g. mobile phones and portable media 
players). As accelerometers are small in size, they could be 
embedded within mobile devices without affecting their overall 
features. A built-in accelerometer allows a device to sense user’s 
movements and, as a result, it provides a modality for user input. 
As more uses of accelerometers are being discovered, we 
confidently predict that mobile devices will be equipped with 
built-in accelerometers. In this paper, our work is based on the use 
of accelerometers to detect users’ movements as inputs for 
authenticating mobile devices. 
1.1 Organization 
We first present the motivation and the design of our work. We 
explore a new gesture-based authentication method for user-
assisted association of mobile devices, specifically for devices 
with limited UI, and we explain how our design can be built to 
work with PIN authentication protocols. We then present the 
results and a discussion of our initial study of the system before 
conclusions are drawn and future directions for research are 
identified.  
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2. MOTIVATION 
There are two basic types of authentication: (i) device authentica-
tion and (ii) user authentication. The former refers to a device 
proving its existence to its connecting peer device(s) (like device 
pairing), and the latter refers to a user proving his/her claimed 
identity to a system that he/she is the genuine individual. In this 
work, our interest is in the use of gesture movements to achieve 
device authentication. 
2.1 Background 
Two publications ([6] and [5]) inspired the work described in this 
paper.  
In [6], Patel et al. suggest a gesture-based authentication scheme 
for pairing a mobile device with an untrusted public terminal 
using a challenge-response protocol. Their use-case scenario 
describes a user who walks up to a public display and 
authenticates his/her handheld device to the display. First, the 
system generates a random series of shakes and pauses as a 
gesture sequence (the challenge), and then the user authenticates 
his/her device by mimicking the gestures of the sequence (the 
response). Their system is suitable for situations when a situated 
terminal with a display output is available at one end of the 
association; however, the scheme cannot be used when only 
mobile devices are involved. Often, device associations happen 
spontaneously; there may not be a display terminal accessible 
during the associations. Furthermore, when multiple devices are 
connecting to a terminal at once, the sharing of the terminal 
display could be problematic. 
In [5], Mayrhofer and Gellersen suggest a method which uses 
accelerometer data to pair two mobile devices. Their method 
requires a user to hold the pairing devices tightly together and 
shake the devices for a short period. As the devices are shaken, 
acceleration data is captured and analysed; afterward, the devices 
will only be paired if the readings of the accelerometers are 
similar. The advantage of this method is that shaking is an easy 
and intuitive gesture as it requires little learning and cognitive 
demand [4, 5]. However, the interaction restricts the number of 
associating devices, as only one user can hold and shake the 
connecting devices at a time. Depending on the sizes of the 
devices, the user cannot hold too many of them at once. 
Consequently, the method is not feasible for situations of forming 
a large-scale network of numerous devices; for instance, a group 
of gamers cannot shake their gaming devices to form an ad hoc 
network. In addition, since only one user can operate the shaking, 
other users are required to surrender their physical possession of 
their devices during authentication. In some social contexts, this 
may not be acceptable or appropriate; e.g. associating devices 
with strangers. 
Although [6] and [5] suggest solutions of using movements for 
pairing a mobile device to a terminal or to another mobile device, 
both solutions have problems when the cardinality of devices 
increases. So far, most of the research done on device association 
is based on pairing of two devices, and we found no existing 
solution that explores device authentication of a group of UI 
limited devices. 
3. DESIGN 
In this section, we present a design solution called GesturePIN. It 
uses movement gestures for associating a group of devices. 
3.1 Input Devices 
As described previously, the aim of this work is to design for 
mobile devices with built-in accelerometers; we therefore assume 
all mobile devices have the facility to capture gestures. 
When associating devices, often the devices have different I/O 
capabilities. For example, some devices have small display 
output, while others may only have a speaker, a vibration motor, 
or LEDs. We therefore classify mobile devices according to their 
I/O capabilities (see table 1). Devices with text or touch input can 
use the standard PIN authentication technique to pair/associate 
devices. We are particularly interested in devices with less input 
capabilities, such as gestures only and simple buttons. We have 
no particular preference for the type of output; the only 
requirement is the output must be able to emit differentiable 
binary signals to the users (e.g. beeping/vibrating/light flashing) 
to indicate a success of a failure. 
Table 1. Classification of I/O capabilities of mobile devices 
3.2 Authenticator 
Similar to the work in [6], our system uses gesture sequences as 
passkeys. We adopt discrete gesture password [2] (shown in 
figure 1) as the gesture elements of our authenticator. The ten 
gesture elements2 are 3D stroke-based directional movements. 
The elements are based on the spatial orientation of the input 
device, and they were designed with the intention that each 
gesture has a symmetrical gesture in the mirror direction (we refer 
readers to [2] for an in-depth discussion of gesture password). 
                                                                 
2 Go to http://goo.gl/vWfK for a video illustration of the ten 
gestures. 
Input 
(all devices are assumed to 
have built-in accelerometers) 
Output 
Gestures only 
Binary (binary signals, e.g. 
beeps, LED flashes, vibrations, 
etc.) 
Simple buttons (for basic 
controls only) + Gestures 
Text (alphanumeric 
characters) 
Text (e.g. a key pad) + 
Gestures 
Multimedia (voice + tunes, 
images, videos) 
Touch (e.g. a touch screen) + 
Gestures 
 
Figure 1. Ten gesture password elements of GesturePIN. (a) 
Forward, (b) Backward, (c) Up, (d) Down, (e) Left, (f) Right, 
(g) Tilt Left, (h) Tilt Right, (i) Swing Left, (j) Swing Right 
a. c. e. g. i. 
b. d. f. h. j. 
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3.3 Device Association Scheme 
For simplicity of demonstration, we adopt the following scenario 
to illustrate our design idea. 
John has a video about his recent vacation uploaded on his 
portable media player. He goes to a cafe to meet his friends and 
to show them the video. After viewing, everyone is very keen to 
have a copy of the video, so John decides to share it. Since there 
are many devices, it would be time consuming to share the file 
individually, so, instead, John initiates a wireless ad hoc network 
to share the file with everyone at once. However, some of the 
devices do not have a number input interface, so PIN 
authentication cannot be done. Instead, GesturePIN is used to 
authenticate the devices. To do so, the group performs the 
following 3-stage procedure: 
Stage 1: Devices Awakening. To start, John and his friends, 
individually, shake their devices rapidly and randomly; if the 
device has a simple button interface, the user pushes it as the 
wake button. This action awakens the devices and informs them 
to start a group connection and to find the network identifiers of 
one another. When each device is ready, it outputs a simple signal 
(e.g. a beep or a pulse of vibration) to indicate it is ready. 
Stage 2: Passkey Sharing. John, the initiator, selects and 
demonstrates a random sequence of gestures (i.e. the passkey), 
and his friends follow his gesture sequence. Since John’s device 
has an output display, his device translates the input gestures into 
a PIN code. John shares the code with those who have the devices 
with number input, so they can use PIN authentication instead. 
Stage 3: Confirming. After entering the passkey, similar to stage 
1, if the device has a simple button interface, the user presses the 
button (e.g. an “OK” button) to confirm the passkey entry. Else, 
the user shakes the device vigorously to indicate confirmation.  
Lastly, the devices output a signal to acknowledge the user input. 
Upon a successful authentication, where everyone has entered the 
same passkey correctly, an ad hoc network is formed, and now, 
John can share his video with his friends. 
3.4 Gestures to PIN Codes Translation 
The ten gestures in figure 1 are compatible with PIN digits; they 
can be translated into each other, like forward = “1”, back = “2”, 
and so forth. As a result, the gesture scheme can be implemented 
on top of any standard PIN entry authentication protocols, e.g. 
Bluetooth pairing, MANA III protocol [3, 9]. A device with only 
gesture input can now authenticate with devices that only have 
number input; however, the restriction is that the gesture input 
device must have a number display (see figure 2 for an 
illustration). 
In addition, the 3-stage device association scheme (in section 3.3) 
is not only limited to the suggested gestures in figure 1. The 
concept of GesturePIN can adopt any types of gestures, as long as 
the gestures are discrete and translatable to PIN digits. For 
example, the shapes of the PIN digits can be drawn as gestures; 
thus, users can write PINs in midair instead of pressing buttons. 
3.5 Security 
Gesture authentication is similar to PIN authentication. When a 
user authenticates his/her device, the user is required to produce 
the correct passkey (a sequence of numbers/gestures) given by the 
initiator. 
Small and specialised devices have limited input. Without number 
input, the current authentication method is limited to either using 
a default passkey or no passkey. Our solution enables users the 
flexibility to select their own passkey, and hence, the key is not 
fixed. By disclosing the chosen passkey only to the legitimate 
peers (via the human channel), an end-to-end authentication is 
assured; thus, preventing impersonation attacks. 
One drawback of using movements is that the system is suscepti-
ble to shoulder surfing attacks. Due to the nature of using 
movements as inputs, an attacker can observe gesture entries [2]. 
Anyhow, our system is designed for transient interactions, like 
file sharing. Once a connection terminates, the passkey is 
discarded; hence, a different passkey is used for each new session. 
An assailant needs to be near the users during the authentication 
to attempt an attack. Besides, the gestures we adopted are based 
on arm movements; faster and more discreet gestures that exploit 
more flexible muscles could be used instead. 
4. USER STUDY 
A quantitative user study was conducted to compare the 
differences in performance between PIN and gesture password. 
The study records the speed and accuracy of password entries. 
Entry speed is defined as the time (measured in seconds) users 
took to enter a valid password, while accuracy is defined as the 
number of attempts used. 18 learners (aged 17 to 33, mean=24.4) 
from a skills training centre in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, were 
recruited as participants. The study was conducted as a repeated 
measures study with each participant exposed to both testing 
systems (PIN and gesture password). 
A PIN authenticator was implemented to log entry time and 
number of tries. The authenticator was implemented as a Java 
MIDlet running on a Sony Ericsson V630i mobile phone. The 
study was conducted without the use of a real gesture password 
prototype. For simplicity and as a proof of concept, the Wizard of 
Oz prototyping technique [7] was adopted (discrete gesture 
password can be implemented as a real prototype, we refer 
readers to [1] for details). The results of each gesture entries were 
recorded by the experiment conductor. A rectangular object (we 
used a mobile phone) was given to the subject to represent a 
sensor device. 
At first, all participants undertook a training session (trained by 
the experiment facilitator) to familiarize themselves with the test-
Figure 2. Alice (A) enters gestures into her device. The 
device translates the gestures into a PIN code (1328) and 
displays the code. Alice reads the code to Bob (B), and Bob 
enters the code into his device using the number keypad.
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ing systems. All of the subjects were familiar with the concept of 
a PIN beforehand; however, since gesture password is a new 
concept, the movements of the ten gestures required explanation 
and illustration, and the subjects were trained until they decided 
they were comfortable using the systems. After training, each 
subject was given a piece of paper printed with five PINs and five 
gesture passwords that were randomly chosen, and the subjects’ 
task was to enter the given passwords. At the end of the study, 90 
PINs and 90 gesture passwords were entered. However, two 
entries of gesture passwords were discarded due to difficulties 
(after three attempts with each of those passwords, the users still 
failed to enter the gestures correctly). 
The results of the time of entries show that on average, the speed 
of entering a valid PIN (M=5.74, SE=0.23) was significantly 
faster than entering a gesture password (M=9.53, SE=0.41), 
t(87)=8.954, p<0.001, r=0.69. 
The measure of accuracy was classified as the subjects using 
either (i) first attempt or (ii) multiple attempts to enter their given 
passwords correctly. We recorded 86 first-attempts and 4 
multiple-attempts for PINs and 48 first-attempts and 40 multiple-
attempts for gesture passwords. A chi-square test showed there is 
a significant difference (χ2=40.21, df=1, p<0.001) in accuracy 
between PINs and gesture passwords. 
4.1 Discussion 
The results from the study show that users’ performance in using 
PINs for authentication is significantly superior to using gesture 
passwords in both speed and accuracy. The results are not 
surprising since the participants were previously familiar with 
PIN but not with gesture password. The subjects’ knowledge of 
PINs can influence their performance, as they already have a 
strategy to cope with PIN. We acknowledge the results of our 
study are biased because the subjects had prior experience with 
PIN; however, we believe it is more realistic to use subjects from 
this population as mobile phones have already been adopted 
pervasively. 
Although the finding shows PIN is significantly superior, the 
means of the time of entries is different by merely a few seconds 
(|9.53–5.74|=3.79s). The mean time of gesture password entries 
shows people enter gestures in a relatively short amount of time. 
We consider the average of 9.53s is acceptable for transient asso-
ciations (e.g. the scenario in section 3.3). However, many failed 
first-attempts were recorded from the gesture entries. For this 
reason, we realized a scheme for correcting wrong gesture entries 
is needed. For example, if an incorrect gesture is entered, the user 
can draw a shape (like a circle or a gesture other than the prede-
fined gestures) to remove the entry. The concept is similar to the 
backspace key (on a standard computer keyboard) for text entry. 
Bearing in mind that the study was the subjects’ first experience 
with gesture password, if a longer period (like days or weeks) was 
given to practise the gestures, the performance of gesture 
password entries may improve and be comparable to PIN. 
Furthermore, since device authentication is not knowledge-based, 
it relieves the users from the burden of recalling passwords [6]. 
Other than device authentication, it is possible to adopt gesture 
password for user authentication; however, it is not recommend-
able, as the results from [2] show gesture passwords are not easily 
memorable. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we presented GesturePIN, a solution that adopts 
discrete gesture password for associating multiple devices, 
especially for devices with limited input capability. Our design 
has the advantages of (i) not restricting the number of associating 
devices (the cardinality can go up to any number of devices) and 
(ii) being able to adapt to work with any PIN authentication 
systems (since discrete gestures can be translated into numbers). 
An initial user study was conducted to compare the speed and 
accuracy between PIN and gesture password entries. The results 
of the study show users performed better in entering PIN; whilst 
PIN may be superior in some ways, the study shows gesture 
password is at least usable, thus it is viable for devices with 
limited UI to adopt GesturePIN. However, further study is needed 
to discover the full potential of gesture password. For future work, 
a fully functional prototype of GesturePIN may yield valuable 
findings, as the prototype can be used for investigating qualitative 
measures like users acceptance, their opinions and the quality and 
the potential uses of the system perceived by the users. 
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